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The independent audit has played a key role in improving the quality of 
economic information, guiding the rational allocation of resources, optimizing the 
corporate governance structure and maintaining the economic order and the social 
public interests. But a series of scandals broke out at home and abroad in recent years 
made the public raise the question on the quality of the independent audit. The quality 
of the independent audit issue becomes the focus of attention. By building game 
model under the condition of the asymmetric information, this paper discusses the 
game timing and the procedures during the course of information disclosure of the 
listed companies and accounting firms, the conditions of false disclosure occurred as 
well as the mechanisms and consequences. It shows the accounting firm mechanism 
not only reduces the interval of the false disclosure in the listed companies but also 
can effectively curb the false disclosure in the listed companies as well as make it 
clear that the accounting firm is basis building of maintaining the effective operation 
of capital markets. On this basis, the relationship between the type and tenure of the 
accounting firm and the audit quality was analyzed by the theory and the model, 
which made a theoretical groundwork for the empirical research later. 
For the empirical research part, the financial statements data coming from the 
results of the game negotiations between the management and external auditors data 
—mainly earnings data was firstly applied in order to test the impact the type and the 
term of accounting firm had upon the audit quality .The empirical results show that 
after controlling the self-selection bias, the Big4 accounting firms provide the audit 
services of higher quality than Non-Big4 accounting firms. For the Big4, the relation 
between audit tenure and audit quality is not significant, while for non- Big4, the audit 
tenure and audit quality takes on the U-shape. Secondly, from the perspectives of 
investors ,examining whether the investors can identify the different effect that the 
type of the accounting firm have on the earnings persistence. The majority of scholar 














stock market and the investors do not fully understand the earning information 
included in the companies. The Mishkin test applied showed that The earnings 
expectations embedded in stock prices success to reflect the different effect of Big4 
and Non-Big4 on earnings persistence， but fail to reflect the different effects of Big4 
and Non-Big4 on the persistence of  the discretionary accruals component, which 
proved that the investor in our country is consistent with the "naive investor" 
hypothesis. 
The main innovation and contribution lie in the research methods and the 
contents. This paper by using the game model deduce the conduct during the course 
of the information disclosure of listed companies and establish the analytical 
framework in which the type and the tenure of the accounting firm have effects on the 
audit quality. For the empirical part, after by adding the IMR variable to control the 
self- selection bias , the discretionary accruals, the earnings  persistence work as the 
representation variables in order to inspect the effect of audit firm type and tenure on 
the audit quality, while taking advantage of Mishkin to test whether the The earnings 
expectations embedded in stock prices is able to react to the effect variance of the 
earnings persistence of the customers brought by the Big4 and the Non-Big4 firms . 
The study of these issues provides a theoretical basis on the relationship between the 
type as well as tenure of the accounting firm and the independent audit quality. On the 
other hand, it has the significant meaning for how to improve the supervision of the 
audit market and improve the competitive structure of the audit market and promote 
the healthy competition in the audit market as well as improve the quality of audit 
services provided by the accounting firms. 
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第 1 章  导论 
1 




改革开放以来我国经济的高速增长，1990 年 12 月和 1991 年 7 月上海证券
交易所和深圳证券交易所相继正式营业，中国证券市场特别是股票市场开始飞速
发展，到 2010 年底，深圳证券交易所共有 1169 家上市公司和 1211 只上市股票，
市场总值达到 86415.4 亿元（其中流通市值 50773.0 亿元），上海证券交易所共有







效运行和投资者资产的安全方面起重要作用（Fan 和 Wong，2005）。 
20 世纪 80 年代以来国外许多学者对影响审计质量的因素进行研究，在影响
审计质量的众多因素中事务所类型（Dopuch 和 Simunic，1980；DeAngelo，1981；
Dye，1993；Khurana 和 Raman，2004；Behn et al.，2008）和事务所任期（Bates 
et al.，1982；Davis et al.，2000；Myers et al.，2005；Turner et al.，2008）成为了
研究的重点。国外研究一般认为四大事务所提供了更高质量的审计服务，在我国
因为“老三案”、“新三案”、“银广夏”、“郑百文”、“蓝田股份”等会计丑闻陆续
曝光，本土事务所审计质量备受质疑，鉴于此中国证监会在 2001 年 12 月 30 日
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